AI-Driven Semiconductor Demand and Malaysia’s Export Conversion Gap
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.56532/mjbem.v5i2.239Keywords:
Artificial intelligence, Semiconductor cycle, Export responsiveness, Global value chains, MalaysiaAbstract
The post-2023 AI semiconductor cycle has raised Malaysia’s strategic visibility as a semiconductor-linked production hub, but visibility does not necessarily translate into export capture. This study examines whether global semiconductor demand has strengthened Malaysia’s electronics-related export responsiveness during the AI-era. Using monthly data from January 2019 to January 2026, Malaysia’s electronics-related exports are proxied by SITC Section 7, the most consistent high-frequency public proxy available for this analysis, while global semiconductor demand is measured using worldwide semiconductor billings. A distributed lag interaction framework is employed to capture the temporal dynamics of demand transmission and to distinguish immediate exposure from cumulative export conversion. The results show that Malaysia remains positively responsive to the global semiconductor cycle, yet the post-AI interaction does not produce contemporaneous amplification. More importantly, the AI-era reshapes the timing of transmission without increasing cumulative strength. Baseline cumulative responsiveness over the six-month window exceeds the AI-era cumulative response, revealing a clear export conversion gap. This gap highlights a structural mismatch between Malaysia’s established strengths in downstream electronics and back-end semiconductor activities and the AI hardware cycle’s concentration in advanced logic, high-performance computing, memory intensity, data-centre infrastructure, and advanced packaging. The findings challenge the assumption that semiconductor supply-chain participation automatically converts AI-driven demand into export gains. The study contributes to global value-chain research and semiconductor industrial-policy debates by offering a trade-based diagnostic of whether strategic visibility becomes measurable export responsiveness.
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